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ABSTRACT
T his paper analyses th e relationships
b e tw e e n
t r a d e - u n i o n ’s
fe e s,
unem ploym ent and m em bers’ incom e
and prospects of employment and the
im plications of th ese relationships for
th e optim al m em bership fee with an
em phasis on th e role of m em bership
level a s a determ inant of th e tradeunion bargaining power.

1. INTRODUCTION

Membership fees are a key factor in workers' decision to join or
leave trade unions. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the
relationships between trade-union membership fees and factors
such as unemployment and members' income and prospects of
being employed. By focusing on the roles of the trade-union's
bargaining power and workers' inclination to withdraw their
membership when union's fee rises the paper demonstrates that
the relationships between unemployment and membership fee,
members' income and membership fee, and members' employment
prospects and membership fee can be depicted by inverted Ushaped curves. These relationships can be incorporated into an
expected utility maximisation framework to determine the
optimal fee for a membership in a trade union. The analysis'
building stones are presented in section 2.
They are used in section 3 to construct the paper's main
proposition about the relationships between unemployment,
members' income and probability of being employed and
membership fee, which are subsequently incorporated into the
determination of the optimal membership fee in section 4. The
paper is concluded in section 5 with a brief summary.
2. BUILDING STONES

The analysis of the relationships between unemployment,
members' income and employment prospects and membership fee
employs the following definitions and assumptions:
L

= the labour force;

U

= the level of unemployment, U<L;

M

= the number of trade-union members;

1

BP = the trade-union's bargaining power;
m

= the trade union's membership fee;

|X

= the membership-withdrawal coefficient — a positive
scalar indicating workers' inclination to withdraw
th eir

trad e-u nion

m em bership

w hen

the

membership-fee rises;
p

= the w orkers' subjective probability of being
unemployed, 0<p<l;

W

= the workers' income if employed; and

S

= the unemployment payment.

Assumption 1: workers' income rises with the trade union's
bargaining power but in diminishing additions as formulated
below:
W = W0 - p / B P

(1)

where (3 is a positive scalar and W0 is the income's upper bound.1
Assumption 2: Membership in a trade union enhances workers
ability to retain jobs proportionally to the trade union's
bargaining power:
p = I - aB P

(2)

where a is a positive scalar indicating the degree of protection
against layoff provided by the trade union for its members.
Assumption 3: The trade-union's bargaining power is proportional
to the membership-unemployment ratio and the membership fee:
M

This specification indicates that BP can also be interpreted as the
ratio betw een the trade-union's budget (mM) and the
unemployment level. It suggests that the larger the trade-union's
membership and budget and the lower the unemployment level
the higher the potential strike costs for employers and hence the
greater the trade-union bargaining power.2
Assumption 4: The demand for labour is downward sloping and
hence a rise in workers' income increases the unemployment level
in the following manner
U = U „ -5 W -W )

(4)

where U0 is the unemployment level associated with W0 and 8 is a
positive scalar.
Assumption 5: The number of trade-union members declines with
the membership fee as described by the following equation:
M -L -\ x m .

(5)

The underlying rationale for this assumption is that the higher the
membership fee the lower the wage differential, or more broadly
the utility differential, between being a trade-union member and
not being a member.3
3. MEMBERSHIP FEE, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND MEMBERS'
INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS

The above assumptions lead to the following proposition about
the relationships between unemployment, members' income and
employment prospects and membership fee.
Proposition 1: Up to a critical membership fee, unemployment level
and members' income and probability o f being employed rise with the
3

trade-union m em bership fee. This critical m em bership fe e is equal to the
ratio o f the labour fo rce to twice the m em bership-w ithdraw al coefficient
( L / 2 / 1 ) . Beyond this critical fe e unemployment level and members'
income and probability o f being employed decline.

The underlying rationale for this proposition is that up to a
membership fee of L/2|x, the trade-union's budget rises despite
the decline in membership and more rapidly than the
unemployment level. Consequently, the trade-union's bargaining
power for securing employment and higher income level for
members increases. Beyond this critical membership fee members'
income and employment probability decline as the trade-union's
budget and bargaining power decrease with the shrinking
membership. Given that the demand for labour is downwardly
sloping, the unemployment level rises initially with the
membership fee and then declines. Interestingly, the larger the
labour force (i.e., the membership's potential upper bound) and
the smaller the membership-withdrawal coefficient, the higher the
critical membership fee.
P r o o f: Equations 1, 3, 4, and 5 imply that the relationship

between unemployment level and membership fee can be
displayed as
j j

__________ Uo________
l + 8 p / (L m -/ im 2)

/^\

and hence the marginal effect of membership fee on the
unemployment level is:
dU

dm

SPU 0 . r 0
>
< L
= --------■ ^ r r (L -2 u m )= 0 ac m —— .

(B+S(3)

<

>2 /i

Furthermore, equations 1, 3, 5 and 6 imply that the relationship
between members' income and membership fee can be rendered as
4

w=w0~

PU0

Lm-jjm2 + 6/3

(7)

and therefore

dW_
dm

pu0
(Lm-jjm2 + S[3)2

Finally, equations 2, 3, 5 and 6 imply that the relationship
betw een the probability of members' em ploym ent and
membership fee can be portrayed as

(8 )

dm

U0

<

4. IMPLICATIONS FOR OPTIMAL MEMBERSHIP FEE

Let us now incorporate the relationships obtained in the previous
section into the determination of the optimal membership fee
within an expected-utility maximisation framework. Let us
postulate that trade-union members are risk averse and maximise
expected utility from disposable income and that the utility
function (u) of the representative member has the following
concave form

u = yr , 0<Y<1.

(9)

Let us ignore, for sake of simplicity, the issues of income tax
and part-time employment. In which case, workers' income after
deduction of membership fee can be perceived as a random

5

variable having a poisson distribution:

y =

W-m

1-p

S-m

p.

(10)

The optimal fee for a membership in the trade union is that
level of m which maximises the members' expected utility

E[ u(y)] = p ( S - m)y+ (1- p)(W- m)7

(

11)

subject to the income equation 7 and the employment-probability
equation 8. This membership fee, m°, should satisfy the firstorder condition for maximum expected utility

dm

dm
—p ( m ° ,0 ) y ( s - m °Y 1

+[1 - p (m 0,<P)]y[W (m°,&) -

-1 ] = 0

(12)

where is the set of the model's parameters (y,S,W0,U 0, L,cc,(5,8,
and jj.) and the explicit forms of W and p are given by equations 7
and 8, respectively.
The complexity of the above expression implies that there is
no closed-form solution for m° and that it is also impossible to
assess analytically the effects of changes in the m odel's
parameters on the optimal membership fee. Moreover, numericalsimulations' results are most likely to be very sensitive to the
choice of the initial-parameter set. Analytically, it can only be
argued that it is optimal that the direction of the effect of a
change in any of the m odel's parameter on the optimal
membership fee coincides with the direction of its effect on the
marginal expected utility from membership fee as suggested by
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the following proposition.

o r -

tdm°

cP E (u(y)).

Proposition 2: Sign { ----- } - S ig n {— - — ------ } for any param eter

dmdty

a(j)

<|>e5>.

Proof: The total differentiation of the necessary condition for
maximum implies
dm0 _
d(j)

d 2E ( u ( y ) ) / dmd(p
d 2E ( u ( y ) ) / dm2

for any (j)e<I>. By virtue of the second-order condition for
maximum the denominator of the ratio on the right-hand side of
equation 13 is negative and hence the direction of the marginal
effect of on m° is determined by the sign of the numerator of that
ratio. QED
5. CONCLUSION

By incorporating the adverse effect of trade-union fees on the
level of membership it has been demonstrated that unemployment
level and members' income and probability of being employed rise
initially with the trade-union's membership fee and then decline
as the bargaining power of the trade union diminishes with the
shrinking membership level. This property has been incorporated
into an expected-utility-maximisation framework for determining
the trade-union's membership fee. The complexity of the resultant
relationship between the representative member's expected utility
and membership fee reveals the difficulty in assessing the
properties of the optimal membership fee analytically.
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FOOTNOTES
1.

The notion of bounded labour-income is compatible with the
assertion that the high unemployment levels associated with
income levels that are higher than W0 lead to social unrest and, in
turn, to the collapse of the political and economic system. For an
elaborate analysis of wage-bargaining outcomes associated with
various models of wage determination and systems of industrial
relations see Creedy and McDonald (1991) and Dowrick (1993).

2.

This assumption is consistent with McDonald and Suen's (1992)
findings with Australian data that union power is negatively
related to unemployment rate and positively related to union
density.

3.

An explicit incorporation of the wage differential and utility
differential arguments into membership decision has been
provided by Christie (1992) and Jones and McKenna (1994).
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